

An information-based theory of financial intermediation

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What do we do?

Develop a new theory of financial intermediation

- ▶ Builds on information frictions
- ▶ Private information on trade motives of investors
Different **hedging motives**, wealth heterogeneity, etc

Main idea: Agents differ in their **screening expertise**

- ▶ Experts more likely to know their counterparty's trade motives
- ▶ It makes them natural intermediaries

Theoretical results:

- ▶ Generates a core-periphery structure with experts at the core
(Green, Hollifield and Schurhoff (2007), Bech and Atalay (2010), Li and Schurhoff (2014), Hollifield, Neklyudov and Spatt (2017), etc.)
- ▶ Screening experts trade faster and extract more rents

Empirical validation of the model

Large investors (over \$100 million in assets) file Form 13F

Provide information about their asset positions

- ▶ We interpret this as revealing their trade needs/type

We use CDS trade data from DTCC to test the model predictions

- ▶ We have information about individual trades, identity of traders, date of trade, etc

We test unique predictions of our theory and we find that they

hold in the data

These predictions do not hold in models of complete information

(Hugonnier, Lester and Weill (2014), Chang and Zhang (2015), Menzio, Jarosch, Farboodi (2016), Farboodi, Jarosch, Shimer (2017), etc.)

Outline

Introduction

Model

Trade probabilities, speed and centrality

Empirical validation

Concluding remarks

Appendix

Model

Environment

Build on Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005)

Time is continuous

Measure one of agents called investors with discount rate $r > 0$

Investor have type $\theta = (\alpha, \nu) \in [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R} := \Theta$

- ▶ Call α the screening expertise
- ▶ Call ν the utility type

Types have distribution $F(\theta)$, density $f(\theta)$ and full support in Θ

Environment

There are assets

Investors can hold either $a = 0$ or $a = 1$ of the asset

- ▶ if $a = 0$ the investor is called an **non-owner**
- ▶ if $a = 1$ the investor is called an **owner**

Instantaneous utility from holding an asset is ν

There is transferable utility

To generate trade in steady state:

- ▶ Assets mature at Poisson rate $\mu > 0$
- ▶ Investors can issue an asset at no cost at Poisson rate $\eta > 0$

Environment

Investors randomly meet in pairs with arrival rate λ

Consider a type θ_o owner and a type θ_n non-owner:

- ▶ with probability α_o , the owner knows (learns) θ_n
- ▶ with probability $1 - \alpha_o$, he does not

The screening expertise determines the probability an investor knows his counterparty type θ

Notation

Distributions: owners $\Phi_o(\theta_o)$ and non-owners $\Phi_n(\theta_n)$

Asset supply: $s \in [0, 1]$

Call $\Delta(\theta)$ the reservation value of a type θ investor

- ▶ M_o denotes the owners distribution of res. values
- ▶ M_n denotes the non-owners distribution of res. values

$$M_o(\Delta_o) = \frac{1}{s} \int \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta(\theta) \leq \Delta_o\}} d\Phi_o(\theta)$$

$$M_n(\Delta_n) = \frac{1}{1-s} \int \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta(\theta) \leq \Delta_n\}} d\Phi_n(\theta).$$

Let m_o and m_n denote the densities of M_o and M_n

Bilateral trade

In a meeting, one investor is selected to propose the terms of trade

- ▶ with probability ξ_o , it is the owner
- ▶ with probability $\xi_n = 1 - \xi_o$, it is the non-owner

When selected and knows the counter-party type

- ▶ the owner asks $\max\{\Delta(\theta_o), \Delta(\theta_n)\}$
- ▶ the non-owner bids $\min\{\Delta(\theta_o), \Delta(\theta_n)\}$

Otherwise, the investor designs an optimal trade mechanism

OBS: If $\alpha = 1$ for all investors, this is just Nash bargaining

Optimal ask and bid under incomplete information

The owner's problem:

$$\max_{ask} obj^o(ask) := [ask - \Delta_o] [1 - M_n(ask)]$$

The non-owner's problem:

$$\max_{bid} obj^n(bid) := [\Delta_n - bid] M_o(bid)$$

- ▶ Problem is analogous to a monopoly/monopsony
- ▶ We show in paper that bid/ask are optimal trade mechanisms

Optimal ask and bid under incomplete information

The owner's problem:

$$\left. \frac{\partial \text{obj}^o}{\partial \text{ask}} \right|_{\text{ask}=\Delta_o} = 1 - M_n(\Delta_o) > 0$$

$$\left. \frac{\partial \text{obj}^n}{\partial \text{bid}} \right|_{\text{bid}=\Delta_n} = -M_o(\Delta_n) < 0$$

- ▶ Owner asks more than $\Delta_o \implies$ trade is distorted
- ▶ Non-owner bids less than $\Delta_n \implies$ trade is distorted

Gains from trade

The owner expected gain from trade is

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_o(\theta_o) = & \xi_o \left\{ \alpha_o \int_{\Delta_o}^{\infty} (\Delta_n - \Delta_o) dM_n + (1 - \alpha_o) (ask_o - \Delta_o) [1 - M_n(ask_o)] \right\} \\ & + \xi_n \int (1 - \alpha_n) (bid_n - \Delta_o) \mathbb{1}_{\{bid_n \geq \Delta_o\}} d \frac{\Phi_n(\theta_n)}{1 - s}\end{aligned}$$

The non-owner expected gain from trade is

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_n(\theta_n) = & \xi_n \left\{ \alpha_n \int_0^{\Delta_n} (\Delta_n - \Delta_o) dM_o + (1 - \alpha_n) (\Delta_n - bid_n) M_o(bid_n) \right\} \\ & + \xi_o \int (1 - \alpha_o) (\Delta_n - ask_o) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq ask_o\}} d \frac{\Phi_o(\theta_o)}{s}\end{aligned}$$

Value functions and reservation value

The value function of investors are

$$rV_o(\theta) = \max\{rV_n(\theta), \nu - \mu[V_o(\theta) - V_n(\theta)] + \lambda(1 - s)\pi_o(\theta)\}$$

$$rV_n(\theta) = \eta[\max\{V_o(\theta), V_n(\theta)\} - V_n(\theta)] + \lambda s\pi_n(\theta)$$

And the reservation value is

$$r\Delta(\theta) = \max\{\nu - (\mu + \eta)\Delta(\theta) + \lambda(1 - s)\pi_o(\theta) - \lambda s\pi_n(\theta), 0\}$$

Distributions

The probability of trade of a type θ owner and non-owner are

$$\bar{q}_o(\theta) = \int q(\theta, \theta_n) \phi_n(\theta_n) d\theta_n, \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{q}_n(\theta) = \int q(\theta_o, \theta) \phi_o(\theta_o) d\theta_o$$

where

$$q(\theta_o, \theta_n) = \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_o\}} \\ - \xi_o(1 - \alpha_o) \mathbb{1}_{\{ask_o > \Delta_n \geq \Delta_o\}} - \xi_n(1 - \alpha_n) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_o > bid_n\}}$$

The time change in the mass of owners with type θ is

$$\dot{\phi}_o(\theta) = \eta \phi_n(\theta) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta(\theta) > 0\}} - \mu \phi_o(\theta) + \lambda [\phi_n(\theta) \bar{q}_n(\theta) - \phi_o(\theta) \bar{q}_o(\theta)]$$

Equilibrium

Definition

A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is given by a family $\{\Delta, \Phi_o, \Phi_n, s, big, ask\}$ satisfying the above conditions

Result: There exists a steady-state symmetric equilibrium

Result: It is still an equilibrium if we allow for optimal contracts

Trade probabilities, speed and centrality

Probability to sell

The probability to sell is

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{q}_o(\theta) = & \xi_o \left\{ \alpha [1 - M_n(\Delta_o)] + (1 - \alpha) [1 - M_n(\text{ask}(\Delta_o))] \right\} \\ & + \xi_n \mathbb{E} \left\{ \alpha_n \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_o\}} + (1 - \alpha_n) \mathbb{1}_{\{\text{bid}(\Delta_n) \geq \Delta_o\}} \right\}\end{aligned}$$

Uninformed owners don't sell to non-owners $\Delta_n \in [\Delta_o, \text{ask}(\Delta_o))$

which implies that $\left. \frac{\partial \bar{q}_o(\theta)}{\partial \alpha} \right|_{\Delta_o} = \xi_o \left\{ M_n(\text{ask}(\Delta_o)) - M_n(\Delta_o) \right\} > 0$

- ▶ Experts sell to more people

Probability to buy

The probability to buy is

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{q}_n(\theta) = & \xi_n \left\{ \alpha M_o(\Delta_n) + (1 - \alpha) M_o(\text{bid}(\Delta_n)) \right\} \\ & + \xi_o \mathbb{E} \left\{ \alpha_o \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_o\}} + (1 - \alpha_o) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \text{ask}(\Delta_o)\}} \right\}\end{aligned}$$

Uninformed non-owners don't buy from owners

$$\Delta_o \in (\text{bid}(\Delta_n), \Delta_n)$$

which implies that $\left. \frac{\partial \bar{q}_n(\theta)}{\partial \alpha} \right|_{\Delta_n} = \xi_n \left\{ M_o(\Delta_n) - M_o(\text{bid}(\Delta_n)) \right\} > 0$

- ▶ Experts buy from more people

Trading speed

The effective trading speed

$$speed_o(\theta) = \lambda \bar{q}_o(\theta) \quad \text{and} \quad speed_n(\theta) = \lambda \bar{q}_n(\theta)$$

For given Δ_o and Δ_n , trading speed is increasing in expertise

We get:

- ▶ **same** contact rate λ , **higher** trading probability

Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017):

- ▶ **higher** contact rate λ , **same** trading probability

What is centrality?

Centrality is the degree in which an investor engages in the business of buying and selling assets

$$c(\theta) = \frac{\lambda}{2Vol} \times \frac{\phi_o(\theta)\bar{q}_o(\theta) + \phi_n(\theta)\bar{q}_n(\theta)}{f(\theta)}$$

where


▶ $Vol = \lambda \int \int q(\theta_o, \theta_n) d\Phi_o(\theta_o) d\Phi_n(\theta_n)$ is the trade volume

Note that $\int c(\theta)f(\theta)d\theta = 1$

Centrality

Centrality is increasing in both: $\bar{q}_o(\theta)$ and $\bar{q}_n(\theta)$


$$\left. \frac{\partial c(\theta)}{\partial \alpha} \right|_{\Delta(\theta)=\tilde{\Delta}} > 0$$



Centrality

Who is more central?

- ▶ Low ν : too costly to buy an asset and wait to sell
- ▶ High ν : too costly to sell an asset and wait to buy



Most central investor is among the best experts!

To wrap it up

Our theory says that

1. Information on counterparties determines trade probability
 - ▶ All else constant, experts—high α investors—trade faster
2. Therefore, more central investors will have high expertise

Now we take these predictions to the data

Empirical validation

How we test the theory?

A subgroup of investors managers have to file Form 13F

- ▶ investment advisers, banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, pension funds, and corporations

They report holdings of all securities regulated by the SEC

- ▶ include equities that trade on an exchange, certain options, shares of closed-end investment companies, and certain debts
- ▶ the information is made available to the public... even any of us can download it from the web

We interpret the report as revealing individual trading needs/types

How we test the theory?

Extend model (economy at steady state): a small group of investors get their type revealed at future time T

- ▶ Common knowledge by all market participants about this

Two main set of predictions (for both buyers and sellers). For those that reveal their type, around T ,

1. Probability of trading increases after T
When counterparty makes offer under full information: **no** distortion
2. But less so if counterparty is central in trade (i.e. high α)
When central counterparty makes offer: **small** distortion

Data

We use CDS trade data from the Trade Information Warehouse (TIW) made available to regulators by the Depository Trust and Clearing House Corporation (DTCC)


- ▶ Trade date
- ▶ Buyer/seller id
- ▶ Reference entity—we use centrally cleared CDS indexes
- ▶ Data range: 1st quarter 2013 - last quarter 2017

Note: Some trades occur through clearing houses. We excluded these trades, unless we were able to match them to a particular buyer and seller

Summary statistics

	North America	All
no. of trades	369,540	921,211
no. of traders	4,128	5,514
no. of traders who report at least once	52	63
no. of trades with reports in same quarter	37,359	86,557
fraction where only buyer reported in that quarter	0.49	0.48
fraction where only seller reported in that quarter	0.48	0.49
fraction where both reported in that quarter	0.03	0.03

Distribution of trades




Distribution of centrality and reporters

Number of traders in the top x percent of centrality


x	All	Reporters
5	207	3
10	416	6
25	1054	13
50	2078	27
100	4128	52

Distribution of reports and delays

Conditional distribution of no. of reports



Conditional distribution of delays



(1) large variation in number of reports

(2) institutions report late and there is variation in delays

$$\text{delay} = \text{report} - \text{official}$$

Implementation of test

Given delays, we cannot use the *official*, rather must use actual *report day*

Question: does a report affects the trade probability?

Approach:

- ▶ Assign randomly a *report day* to those traders in any trade with no reports
use empirical distribution of delays
some trades linked to a **real** *report day*; others linked to **fake** *report day*
- ▶ Question: is trade more likely when a real report happened in the previous N weeks?

Empirical specification

Let $trader \in \{buyer, seller\}$

$R_{trader_j,i,k,t}^N = 1$ if trader j in trade i , trading asset CDS on entity k at time t , had an *ard* within N weeks before the trade date

$real_{trader_j,i} = 1$ if trader j *ard* in trade i is real

$top_{trader_j,i} = 1$ if trader j in trade i is among the top 5 in centrality

Specification:

$$R_{trader_j,i,k,t}^N = \gamma_1 real_{trader_j,i} + \gamma_2 real_{trader_j,i} \times top_{trader_{-j},i} + FE_j + FE_k + FE_t$$

Theory predicts: γ_1 positive and γ_2 negative (for both buyer and seller)

Results - North American entities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	1 week	1 week	2 weeks	2 weeks	3 weeks	3 weeks
<i>real_{buyer}</i>	0.0374*** (0.00277)	0.0278*** (0.00308)	0.111*** (0.00373)	0.0910*** (0.00413)	0.130*** (0.00450)	0.107*** (0.00498)
<i>real_{buyer} * top_{seller}</i>	-0.0163*** (0.00319)	-0.0122*** (0.00347)	-0.0601*** (0.00429)	-0.0575*** (0.00466)	-0.0320*** (0.00518)	-0.0482*** (0.00562)
Constant	0.0377*** (0.000338)		0.0702*** (0.000455)		0.107*** (0.000549)	
Observations	348,903	348,012	348,903	348,012	348,903	348,012
R-squared	0.001	0.016	0.004	0.027	0.006	0.030
Within R-squared		.0003		.0014		.0015
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	1 week	1 week	2 weeks	2 weeks	3 weeks	3 weeks
<i>real_{seller}</i>	0.0304*** (0.00288)	0.0299*** (0.00323)	0.0954*** (0.00385)	0.0832*** (0.00431)	0.120*** (0.00469)	0.103*** (0.00524)
<i>real_{seller} * top_{buyer}</i>	-0.00731** (0.00329)	-0.0107*** (0.00361)	-0.0412*** (0.00440)	-0.0427*** (0.00482)	-0.0295*** (0.00536)	-0.0403*** (0.00586)
Constant	0.0377*** (0.000337)		0.0689*** (0.000450)		0.107*** (0.000548)	
Observations	348,903	348,205	348,903	348,205	348,903	348,205
R-squared	0.001	0.015	0.003	0.021	0.005	0.025
Within R-squared		0.0003		0.0012		0.0013
FE	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Concluding remarks

We construct a theory of financial intermediation

- ▶ Builds on information asymmetries
- ▶ Central investors are screening experts
- ▶ Generates the observed market structure

We derive and test **two** testable implications particular to our model

- ▶ An investor trade probability increases when information about his trade motives is publicly released
- ▶ Effect is muted when trading with central investors (i.e. experts, through the lens of our model)
- ▶ These predictions hold in the CDS data

These predictions **follow** from our theory of financial intermediation due to private information, but **do not follow** from any of the theories of financial intermediation relying on complete information

Private information and related literature

Economics has a long tradition of studying the role of information asymmetries in determining financial markets outcomes

- ▶ **Centralized markets**

Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), Radner (1979), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Milgrom and Stokey (1982), etc

- ▶ **Decentralized markets**

Duffie, Malamud, and Manso (2009), Babus and Kondor (2013), Golosov, Lorenzoni, and Tsyvinski (2014), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), Lester, Shourideh, Venkateswaran, and Zetlin-Jones (2015), etc

Study

- ▶ Prices
- ▶ Learning
- ▶ Efficiency
- ▶ What we do?

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
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Study

- ▶ Prices
- ▶ Learning
- ▶ Efficiency
- ▶ What we do? **Intermediation**

Inter-dealer market for ABS, CDO, CMBS and CMO



Private information and related literature

Main focus has been **expertise** in the sense of

what people know about assets \implies common value

- ▶ profits of a firm, changes in interest rates, etc

We shift the focus to **expertise** in the sense of

what people know about other people \implies private value

Myerson (1981), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), etc

- ▶ hedge motives, liquidity needs, etc

Information asymmetry has **built-in** a theory of intermediation

Results - North American assets; reporters only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	1 week	1 week	2 weeks	2 weeks	3 weeks	3 weeks
<i>real_{buyer}</i>	0.0381*** (0.00305)	0.0233*** (0.00441)	0.121*** (0.00404)	0.0847*** (0.00583)	0.143*** (0.00488)	0.115*** (0.00702)
<i>real_{buyer} * top_{seller}</i>	-0.0163*** (0.00337)	-0.0123*** (0.00375)	-0.0601*** (0.00447)	-0.0559*** (0.00496)	-0.0320*** (0.00540)	-0.0456*** (0.00597)
Constant	0.0370*** (0.000917)		0.0610*** (0.00121)		0.0935*** (0.00147)	
Observations	69,661	69,636	69,661	69,636	69,661	69,636
R-squared	0.004	0.012	0.018	0.029	0.026	0.043
Within R-squared		.0004		.0033		.0039
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	1 week	1 week	2 weeks	2 weeks	3 weeks	3 weeks
<i>real_{seller}</i>	0.0540*** (0.00590)	0.0504*** (0.00757)	0.116*** (0.00781)	0.0823*** (0.0100)	0.144*** (0.00966)	0.00822 (0.0124)
<i>real_{seller} * top_{buyer}</i>	-0.0482*** (0.00781)	-0.0162 (0.0158)	-0.0762*** (0.0103)	-0.0411** (0.0209)	-0.0610*** (0.0128)	0.00914 (0.0258)
Constant	0.0373*** (0.000739)		0.0669*** (0.000979)		0.108*** (0.00121)	
Observations	69,661	69,316	69,661	69,316	69,661	69,316
R-squared	0.001	0.032	0.004	0.035	0.004	0.041
Within R-squared		0.0007		0.0010		0.00001
FE	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results - All assets

	(1) 1 week	(2) 1 week	(3) 2 weeks	(4) 2 weeks	(5) 3 weeks	(6) 3 weeks
<i>real_{buyer}</i>	0.0481*** (0.00168)	0.0484*** (0.00197)	0.109*** (0.00225)	0.0999*** (0.00264)	0.130*** (0.00270)	0.111*** (0.00316)
<i>real_{buyer} * top_{seller}</i>	-0.0253*** (0.00200)	-0.0204*** (0.00211)	-0.0480*** (0.00268)	-0.0414*** (0.00281)	-0.0256*** (0.00321)	-0.0240*** (0.00337)
Constant	0.0370*** (0.000212)		0.0680*** (0.000284)		0.102*** (0.000341)	
Observations	865,094	864,092	865,094	864,092	865,094	864,092
R-squared	0.001	0.009	0.004	0.015	0.006	0.019
Within R-squared		0.0007		0.0018		0.0018
	(7) 1 week	(8) 1 week	(9) 2 weeks	(10) 2 weeks	(11) 3 weeks	(12) 3 weeks
<i>real_{seller}</i>	0.0365*** (0.00170)	0.0436*** (0.00204)	0.0981*** (0.00227)	0.0985*** (0.00272)	0.123*** (0.00272)	0.128*** (0.00326)
<i>real_{seller} * top_{buyer}</i>	-0.0174*** (0.00203)	-0.0127*** (0.00215)	-0.0448*** (0.00270)	-0.0378*** (0.00286)	-0.0298*** (0.00324)	-0.0214*** (0.00342)
Constant	0.0392*** (0.000217)		0.0711*** (0.000289)		0.107*** (0.000347)	
Observations	865,094	864,265	865,094	864,265	865,094	864,265
R-squared	0.001	0.009	0.003	0.013	0.005	0.017
Within R-squared	no	0.0006		0.0016		0.0023
FE	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results - All assets; reporters only

	(1) 1 week	(2) 1 week	(3) 2 weeks	(4) 2 weeks	(5) 3 weeks	(6) 3 weeks
<i>real_{buyer}</i>	0.0488*** (0.00186)	0.0499*** (0.00254)	0.115*** (0.00247)	0.0989*** (0.00338)	0.139*** (0.00294)	0.110*** (0.00401)
<i>real_{buyer} * top_{seller}</i>	-0.0253*** (0.00212)	-0.0199*** (0.00226)	-0.0480*** (0.00283)	-0.0385*** (0.00301)	-0.0256*** (0.00336)	-0.0214*** (0.00358)
Constant	0.0364*** (0.000552)		0.0625*** (0.000736)		0.0933*** (0.000875)	
Observations	180,725	180,696	180,725	180,696	180,725	180,696
R-squared	0.005	0.009	0.018	0.024	0.025	0.034
Within R-squared		0.0021		0.0047		0.0045
	(7) 1 week	(8) 1 week	(9) 2 weeks	(10) 2 weeks	(11) 3 weeks	(12) 3 weeks
<i>real_{seller}</i>	0.0384*** (0.00311)	0.0589*** (0.00461)	0.0989*** (0.00408)	0.108*** (0.00606)	0.119*** (0.00486)	0.103*** (0.00721)
<i>real_{seller} * top_{buyer}</i>	-0.0316*** (0.00458)	-0.00482 (0.00587)	-0.0651*** (0.00602)	-0.0162** (0.00771)	-0.0556*** (0.00716)	0.00217 (0.00918)
Constant	0.0415*** (0.000485)		0.0734*** (0.000638)		0.109*** (0.000759)	
Observations	180,725	180,251	180,725	180,251	180,725	180,251
R-squared	0.001	0.020	0.003	0.023	0.004	0.024
Within R-squared		0.0009		0.0018		0.0012
FE	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent	no	trader qrt ent

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Extension

Same economy as before and in steady state

A measure zero of investors receive a shock

These investors have to reveal their types in period $T > 0$

Call these the $13F$ investors

All the equilibrium conditions extend in a trivial way

- ▶ before time T : trades use the appropriate mechanism
- ▶ after time T : there is complete information of $13F$ investors

Results

Let $\bar{q}_{ot}^{13F}(\theta)$ be the probability that a 13F owner of type θ sell an asset in period t on a meeting with a non-owner investor

For $t < T$

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{q}_{ot}^{13F}(\theta) = & \xi_o \left\{ \alpha [1 - M_n(\Delta_{ot}^{13F})] + (1 - \alpha) [1 - M_n(\text{ask}(\Delta_{ot}^{13F}))] \right\} \\ & + \xi_n \mathbb{E} \left\{ \alpha_n \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_{ot}^{13F}\}} + (1 - \alpha_n) \mathbb{1}_{\{\text{bid}_t^{13F}(\Delta_n) \geq \Delta_{ot}^{13F}\}} \right\}\end{aligned}$$

For $t \geq T$

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{q}_{ot}^{13F}(\theta) = & \xi_o \left\{ \alpha [1 - M_n(\Delta_{ot}^{13F})] + (1 - \alpha) [1 - M_n(\text{ask}(\Delta_{ot}^{13F}))] \right\} \\ & + \xi_n \mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_{ot}^{13F}\}} \right\}\end{aligned}$$


Results

$\bar{q}_{ot}^{13F}(\theta)$ is discontinuous at T and the jump is

$$\lim_{\epsilon \searrow 0} \bar{q}_{oT+\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) - \bar{q}_{oT-\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) = \xi_n \mathbb{E} \left\{ (1 - \alpha_n) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_{oT}^{13F} \geq \text{bid}_T^{13F}(\Delta_n)\}} \right\} > 0$$

The above equation implies that:

1. 13F owners are more likely to sell after the report
2. but not with high α_n non-owners




Results

$\bar{q}_{ot}^{13F}(\theta)$ is discontinuous at T and the jump is

$$\lim_{\epsilon \searrow 0} \bar{q}_{oT+\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) - \bar{q}_{oT-\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) = \xi_n \mathbb{E} \left\{ (1 - \alpha_n) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_{oT}^{13F} \geq \text{bid}_T^{13F}(\Delta_n)\}} \right\} > 0$$

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
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$\bar{q}_{ot}^{13F}(\theta)$ is discontinuous at T and the jump is

$$\lim_{\epsilon \searrow 0} \bar{q}_{oT+\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) - \bar{q}_{oT-\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) = \xi_n \mathbb{E} \left\{ (1 - \alpha_n) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_{oT}^{13F} \geq \text{bid}_T^{13F}(\Delta_n)\}} \right\} > 0$$

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
Results

$\bar{q}_{ot}^{13F}(\theta)$ is discontinuous at T and the jump is

$$\lim_{\epsilon \searrow 0} \bar{q}_{oT+\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) - \bar{q}_{oT-\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) = \xi_n \mathbb{E} \left\{ (1 - \alpha_n) \mathbb{1}_{\{\Delta_n \geq \Delta_{oT}^{13F} \geq \text{bid}_T^{13F}(\Delta_n)\}} \right\} > 0$$

The above equation implies that:

1. 13F owners are more likely to sell after the report
2. but not with high α_n non-owners




Results

$\bar{q}_{nt}^{13F}(\theta)$ is discontinuous at T and the jump is

$$\lim_{\epsilon \searrow 0} \bar{q}_{nT+\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) - \bar{q}_{nT-\epsilon}^{13F}(\theta) = \xi_s \mathbb{E} \left\{ (1 - \alpha_o) \mathbb{1}_{\{\text{ask}_T^{13F}(\Delta_o) \geq \Delta_{nT}^{13F} \geq \Delta_o\}} \right\} > 0$$

The above equation implies that:

1. 13F non-owners are more likely to buy after the report
2. but not with high α_n non-owners



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